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Abstract:
In this paper, we argue that particular institutional arrangements partly explain the large
andpersistent differences in health systems andhealth outcomes observed former colonies
countries. Drawing on data from the World Health Organization for 62 countries, cov-
ering the period 2000-2014, we explore whether economic (risk of expropriation) and
health (complete cause of death registries) institutions explain mortality rates and access
to healthcare. To identify this relationship, we use settlermortality and the distance of the
capital from the nearest major port – factors associated with institutional arrangements
– to explain cross-national variation in health outcomes and the universality of health
systems. We find that inclusive institutions arrangements – that protect and acknowl-
edge the rights of citizens – are associated with better health outcomes (e.g. lower infant
mortality and lower maternal mortality) as well as with better health systems (e.g. more
skilled birth attendance and greater immunization). Inclusive institutions not only foster
economic growth but improves health and well-being too (JEL: I10, P16, P51).
I
On20 July 2014, after ravaging theWestAfrican countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone, andGuinea,
the Ebola virus reached Lagos, Nigeria, one of Africa’s largest and most densely populated
cities (Tilley-Gyado 2015; WHO 2014). Panic regarding the epidemic intensified instantly. If
the virus was not immediately contained, it risked escalating into an irreversible global crisis.
*Replication materials are available here: https://github.com/asreeves/origins-health
†Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, michael.miller1@icahn.mssm.edu
‡Dondena Centre, Bocconi University, veronica.toffolutti@unibocconi.it
§London School of Economics and University of Oxford, aaron.reeves@spi.ox.ac.uk
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Public health officials worried Ebola would expose persistent governance challenges and coor-
dination problems in theNigerian health system; but these fears did notmaterialize. TheNige-
rian government successfully prevented the mass transmission of Ebola, documenting only 19
infections and 7 fatalities (WHO 2016). By contrast, the virus reached epidemic proportions
in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea; with more than 28,600 cases and 11,300 deaths (WHO
2014). The Ebola epidemic illuminates the profound disparities in health systems across West
Africa, but these disparities are not only apparent in those fewcountries directly affected by this
localized epidemic. Immunization, infant mortality, and access to healthcare all exhibit jarring
levels of inequality between countries, even those with comparable geographies and similar
disease burdens (World Bank 2015). What, then, explains these massive disparities in health
coverage and health outcomes brought into stark visibility by the Ebola epidemic (Robinson,
Acemoglu, and Johnson 2003)?
In this paper we argue that institutional differences – the formal and informal constraints on
human interaction (North 1994) – inherited from the colonial period partly explain the large
and persistent differences in health systems and the improvements in health they deliver today.
Institutions are the rules and regulations of society (Beckfield et al. 2015; Kalleberg 2009) and
these rules can be, to differing degrees, extractive or inclusive. The former exist when rules do
not protect people from exploitation. Extractive institutions, then, may offer little protection
for private property, few safeguards against government expropriation, and often fail to rec-
ognize the rights of citizens. Extractive institutions, in fact, may be the source of exploitation
(Scheidel 2017). Inclusive institutions, by contrast, are characterized by pluralism, wheremany
people are included in the processes of political and economic governance. They aremarked by
stricter adherence to law and order, more stringent protection of private property, some con-
straints on executive power, and more robust recognition of citizenship, hence exploitation is
often attenuated (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001).
Formany countries, the creation ofmore extractive (ormore inclusive) institutions is rooted in
the colonial period, and the influence of these critical junctures on society continues to be felt
today (Banerjee and Iyer 2005; Besley 1995; Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau 2006; Mahoney
2010). For example, the establishment of extractive institutions by colonial powers constrained
economic development in former colonies after independence, affecting whether contempo-
rary societies are richer or poorer (Acemoglu et al. 2001). Colonial institutional legacies may
affect health too but here the evidence is far less certain (Lange et al. 2006). Mahoney (2010)
has examined this question using data from former Spanish colonies and documents persistent
differences in social development over time according to the type of institutions established
under colonial rule. While almost all countries improve, their relative position with respect to
other former colonies remains relatively stable: that is, those Latin American countries with
better life expectancy and infant mortality in 1975 still have better outcomes 30 years later.
One important gap in this earlier work, however, is whether these colonial institutions af-
fect health only through their impact on economic growth; for ‘wealthier is healthier’ (Deaton
2015; Pritchett and Summers 1996). Of course, as the Ebola example illustrates, institutional
arrangements may directly influence health, independent of their effect on development (Ken-
tikelenis et al. 2015). And so, whether – independent of development – the inheritance of
extractive institutions affects health system coverage and/or health outcomes in the present
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remains an open question.
Like economic development, institutions may affect health because they stipulate the formal
structures and rules governing relations between actors within societies, shaping social inter-
actions and guiding what is fair and reasonable under certain circumstances (Kalleberg 2011).
For example, one set of institutions that may influence health is the creation of rules deter-
mining property rights. These institutional rules stipulate who can own land and other assets
while also providing protections against the risk of expropriation (Soto 2000). Guaranteeing
property rights is a form of inclusive institutional arrangements that has been closely linked
with economic development (through encouraging investment in physical and human capital),
but also with improved health and education among children in specific settings (Besley 1995;
Galiani and Schargrodsky 2004, 2010).
Another set of inclusive institutions that may directly impact health is the establishment of a
national registration system of deaths (Acemoglu, Gallego, and Robinson 2014; Mathers et al.
2005; Szreter 2007). These institutions are inclusive because they establish a legal identity that
is foundational to property rights, voting rights, and other entitlements from the state (Szreter
2007). Registering deaths (and births) was integral to the development of citizenship and the
creation of robust healthcare systems (Szreter 2007). Death registration systems are not new
– England established their system in 1538 – but many less developed countries still do not
possess routinized procedures for recording deaths (and births), while in other contexts reg-
istration systems are only partial at best (Mathers et al. 2005). Inclusive institutions which
create formal legal identities are also central to demographic analysis; for, if countries are to
take seriously their responsibility to protect and enhance the life expectancy of their citizens,
they must have access to accurate data on births and deaths (Szreter 2007). In focusing on na-
tional registration systems, we follow Lange et al. (2006), who stressed the importance of ‘state
institutions’ in fostering social development because they promoted the ‘rule of law’ and the
creation of state bureaucracies, which are essential to the establishment of effective healthcare
systems (Lange 2004; Lange et al. 2006). Carefully recording deaths, not only ensures that
rights are protected, but it also reveals where greater resources are required, allowing health-
care providers of various kinds to target their efforts to those areas where improvement is both
needed and possible. As Jha has argued, establishing public registration systems is ‘one of the
world’s best investments to reduce premature mortality’ ( Jha 2012).
Clearly, it is possible to a draw a plausible causal connection between the types of institutional
arrangements installed in a country and whether a country can ensure healthy lives for all of
their citizens (Marmot et al. 2008). The establishment of inclusive or exclusive institutionswill
shape the structure of societies and this, in turn, may affect the health of populations (Kalleberg
2011; Reeves et al. 2014).
Although institutions may affect health, simply adopting inclusive institutions does not im-
mediately guarantee everyone can attain a healthy life. Even when particular institutions have
been formally changed, pre-existing institutional arrangements continue to cast a long-shadow
over social outcomes (Banerjee and Duflo 2014). One reason for the durability of these effects
is that institutions are path dependent (Pierson 2000; Thelen 2003) and so the current insti-
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tutional arrangements seen in former colonies will have roots in decisions made by European
powers during the nineteenth century (Banerjee and Iyer 2005). Slavery was formally abol-
ished in the U.S. in the 1860s but the political effects of these previous institutional arrange-
ments continue to persist today (Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2016b). In fact, the lingering
effect of colonial institutions on health may be particularly acute. Jim Crow laws, for exam-
ple, were repealed in 1965 but the health effects of these segregating institutions persisted for
many decades afterward (Krieger et al. 2014, 2013). The same is likely true of other colonial
institutions too. Institutional arrangements concerning law and order and private property es-
tablished during the colonial period often became the basis for post-independence institutional
systems in former colonies (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001), and while such arrange-
ments have no doubt been altered, the inherited framework persists. Thus, while many of the
‘institutions from the colonial period… have been superseded’ by less explicitly extractive ar-
rangements (Mahoney 2010), the type of institutions installed by colonizers may continue to
influence the health of populations today.
The institutional arrangements established by colonial powers were contingent on both the
colonizer’s identity and the initial conditions faced by the invading power. While colonization
was uniformly brutal to the indigenous population, some patterns of colonization were more
common among some colonizers than others. Britain, for example, tended to create more ‘lib-
eral’ institutions, which encouraged development, rather than ‘mercantilist’ institutions, which
did not (Lange et al. 2006). But, these decisions were not standardized within particular col-
onizers; ‘many forms of colonial domination existed… within each colonial empire’ (Lange et
al. 2006). Within Britain’s general tendency to create ‘liberal’, inclusive institutions, it still in-
stalled both inclusive and extractive institutions in different places (Lange 2004) . Moreover,
even when colonial powers installed extractive institutions, they managed those institutions
quite differently. Spanish extractive institutions required a substantial colonial presence while
British extractive institutions did not (Mahoney 2010). Alongside the colonizer’s identity, de-
cisions to establish more extractive institutions within a colony were partly determined by the
initial conditions faced by settlers to these regions, such as population density and the pres-
ence of certain natural resources (Lange et al. 2006). Establishing inclusive institutions was
not without costs and so colonizers sometimes regarded these additional costs as excessive; in
these circumstances, colonizers seem to have focused on extracting wealth from these regions
(Curtin 1998). Thus, extractive institutions were far more common in contexts where, for ex-
ample, the rates of settler mortality were high since the settlers themselves were less likely to
benefit from installing costly inclusive institutions (Acemoglu et al. 2001).
Settler mortality, of course, is not the only driver of the type of colonial institutions installed
in particular contexts (Lange 2004; Lange et al. 2006; Mahoney 2010). We argue that estab-
lishing inclusive institutions would also have been more costly in contexts where the major
economic centers of the colonized regions were more isolated (e.g., further from the closest
major port). European powers invariably relied on shipping and ports to establish trade links
and to extract wealth, and so if the main economic centers were further away from these ports
then establishing such links would be more difficult and more costly (Stasavage 2010). The
connections between economic centers and ports partly explains why isolated cities tend to
have weaker political institutions (Campante and Do 2014; Stasavage 2010). However, this
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measure is different from the ‘centrality’ of the colony, which is concerned with whether the
colonies themselves were central or peripheral to the colonizer (Lange et al. 2006). Rather, by
calculating the distance between the major economic centre and the closest major port, this
measure is attempting to identify one of the initial conditions that may have influenced the
decision of colonizers to install extractive or inclusive institutions.
If these hypotheses are correct then we would expect to see more extractive institutions in
contexts where settler mortality was high – as documented by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robin-
son (2001) – and where transaction costs with the colony were higher too, namely where the
main economic centers were further from the closest port (Stasavage 2010). We deploy these
hypotheses to argue that extractive institutions established during the colonial era may have
affected the development of universal health coverage and health outcomes, independent of
their effect on economic development. We test this theory using a 2SLS model with data on
mortality rates and health systems performance for 62 former colonies. Our model relies on
two sources of exogenous variation in the colonial origins of institutional formation. As sug-
gested above, these include the settler mortality rate in colonies between the 17th and 19th
centuries (Acemoglu et al. 2001) and the distance from the capital city to the main port in the
19th century. Aside from adding this new instrument, we also make two methodological con-
tributions. First, we explore two kinds of inclusive institutions. Following Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson (2001), we measure inclusive economic institutions as protection against ex-
propriation. But we also introduce a novel measure of inclusive health-related institutions,
particularly those centered on the state (Lange et al. 2006), namely the completeness of cause
of death registration (Szreter 2007). Second, we specifically address the endogeneity between
institutional formations and economic development without directly controlling for GDP, so
as to avoid the bias created by conditioning on post-treatment variables (Acharya, Blackwell,
and Sen 2016a). Below we describe our method in more detail.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present the data and the methods. In
section 3 we outline the main results. We present the robustness checks in section 4 and finally
we conclude in section 5.
D
D
The sample consists of 62 former colonies covering the period 2000-2014, from the World
Health Orgaization’s (WHO) Global Health Observatory data repository and the World Bank
Open database (World Bank 2015). We limit our sample to 62 former colonies since these are
the countries for which we could obtain settler mortality data (Acemoglu et al. 2001). This is
not a random sample of countries and for comparison we report a full list of former European
colonies in web appendix 1.
To capture health coverage, we apply the WHO’s three-dimensions of health coverage: (1)
health services, (2) health financing, and (3) population coverage. For health services, we use
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three of the WHO’s suggested indicators: percentage of children obtaining all three doses of
the diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis vaccine (DPT3), measles immunization coverage, and per-
centage of births attended by skilled health personnel. Tomeasure health spending, we include
out of pocket expenditure as a percentage of total health expenditure. Lastly, to measure popu-
lation coverage, we also include a direct measure of Universal Health Coverage (UHC) defined
as ‘formal health coverage as % of the population,’ which measures the proportion of the popu-
lation covered by state, social, private andmutual health insurance schemes. This is taken from
the International Labour Organization (ILO. 2010; ILO 2008) in line with the previous litera-
ture (Feigl and Ding 2013; Reeves et al. 2015). More broadly, we follow the literature looking
at health coverage by examining causes of mortality that are amenable to intervention, namely
maternal mortality, neonatal mortality, infant mortality, and under-five mortality (McKee et
al. 2013; Moreno-Serra and Smith 2012; Reeves et al. 2015). Where possible we take the
country-specific average over the period 2000-2014 to reduce the influence of outliers from
any single year. Importantly, while we try to abide by the WHO’s recommended three dimen-
sions of UHC, we recognize that our operationalization captures health access and services
more than measures of health insurance coverage. This is partly due to imperfect data, but
also grounded in the understanding that most health delivery, and therefore health coverage,
in former colonies is not funded through health insurance models.
We use two measures of institutional arrangements in a society, which are proxies for the de-
gree to which institutions are extractive or inclusive. First, we take the average of the protec-
tion against expropriation risk index over 1985 – 1995. This comes from Acemoglu, John-
son and Robinson who derive it from the Political Risk Services (Acemoglu et al. 2001). The
variable is scaled from 0 to 10 with a higher score representing greater protection against ex-
propriation. This measure of the protection against expropriation risk is averaged across this
period because differences between countries will largely persist over time.
Our second measure of institutional arrangements comes from Mathers et al. and is the com-
pleteness of death registration measured in 2003, according to whether International Classi-
fication of Disease (ICD) codes are used to report mortality (Mathers et al. 2005). Countries
are assigned membership to one of four categories from 0 to 3: 0 = Country reports no recent
death registration data, 1 = Low quality death registration data (Proportion of deaths recorded
is less than 70% or ill-defined ICD codes are used on more than 20% of registrations), 2 =
Medium quality death registration data (Proportion of deaths recorded is between 70-90% or
ill-defined ICD codes are used on between 10-20% of registrations. Alternatively, countries
are also coded as 2 if they are using non-ICD codes, the proportion of deaths recorded is above
90%, and ill-defined codes appear less than 10% of registrations), 3 = Countries with high qual-
ity death registrationdata (Proportionof deaths recorded is over 90%and ill-defined ICDcodes
are used on less than 10% of registrations) (Mathers et al. 2005).
Our controls include measures of cross-national wealth, as well as country specific controls
such as latitude and the infection rate due to malaria. Data on wealth, measured as the average
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita between 2000 and 2014, adjusted for purchasing-
power, come from the World Bank Open Database (World Bank 2018). Latitude represents the
absolute value of the latitude of a country (i.e. a measure of the distance from the equator) and
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is scaled from 0 to 1 and taken from La Porta et al. (1999). For malaria, we use WHO country
estimates of infection rates and subsequently divide them by population size to capture infec-
tion rates per capita. We use the infection rate and not the mortality rate because the former
is primarily a measure of the natural disease burden and not the governments’ effectiveness at
treating it, which would likely be endogenous.
S M
O L S (OLS) A
To investigate the association between health coverage and institutions we start by applying an
OLS model, as follows:
log(Healthi) =µ+ α1Institutionsi + β1log(GDPi) + γXi + ϵi (1)
Here, i indexes the country. Health is a vector representing the various measures of health
outcomes and health coverage noted above for country i for the period 2000-2014. µ is a
constant, Institutions is also a vector representing our two measures of institutional arrange-
ments, i) the average protection against expropriation risk measure in line with Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2001) and ii) the proportion of deaths recorded in line with Mathers et
al (2005). GDP is the average gross domestic product per capita deflated by Price Purchasing
Parity (although we calculate GDP using a different approach, described below, because it is
a post-treatment variable); X is a vector of other country-specific covariates (i.e. latitude and
the infection rate due to malaria), and ϵ is a random error term. α1 is the coefficient of interest,
estimating whether countries with more ‘inclusive’ institutions have better health outcomes.
I V (IV) A
OLS regression models, of course, cannot determine the direction of causality. Institutions
may affect health (by granting individual rights that improve access to healthcare and others
services) but the reverse is also possible (healthier populations may be more concerned with
implementing better institutions). Put differently, inclusive institutions (e.g. those countries
that have put themost effort intomaintaining or creating an effective death registration system
or granting greater protection against expropriation) might also be the places most likely to
monitor their individuals’ health with the aim of having healthier populations. Further, any
observed association between institutions and health may be due to an unobserved factor that
causes both institutions and health. We therefore adopt an instrumental variable approach to
try to address the potential bias in the OLS estimates.
We have identified two separate instruments. The first uses the same instrument as Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2001), measuring the mortality rates of soldiers, bishops and sailors
stationed in the colonies between the 17th and 19th centuries (settlers’ mortality). The in-
tuition behind this instrument – as argued above – is that European powers were aware of
these mortality rates and they strongly determined whether colonizers tried to replicate Eu-
ropean institutions (the so-called “Neo-Europes”), with a strong emphasis on private prop-
erty and checks against government expropriation. In short, inclusive institutions were more
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common in countries where settlers’ mortality was low since colonizers were building such
institutions for their own well-being. This is in contrast to countries where settler mortality
was high, and therefore colonizers were building institutions purely to extract capital from the
indigenous population with little regard for their welfare. As we have argued previously, in-
stitutions are path dependent and the early establishment of more inclusive institutions partly
explains the presence of modern institutional “inclusivity”: average protection against expro-
priation and comprehensive of death registration. Thus, we suggest that settler mortality is
associated with modern institutions because these early institutions subsequently affected the
post-independence trajectory of former colonies. At the same time, we argue that settler mor-
tality rates in the past are unlikely to be correlated with modern post-colonial health because
of both greater indigenous immunity to tropical diseases and better treatment of the specific
diseases most likely to kill settlers. We examine this in more detail below.
As an additional instrument, we use the distance between the capital city and the major port
(Distance in KM) in the country during the 19th century as calculated by the authors (see Web
Appendix 2). We identify capital cities and ports following Campante and Do (2014), who use
historical and other online sources, and we then calculate distances between the cities and the
ports using online distance calculators. In situations where the country is landlocked we se-
lect the nearest major port possessed by the same colonizer. The intuition here is that when
the main economic centers of a colony were further away from major ports possessed by the
same colonizer there would be higher transaction costs, which may encourage extractive re-
lationships between colonizers and the colonized in order to ensure return on investment. In
other words, in colonies where the cost of extraction was greater (i.e. colonies with economic
centers further from major ports), colonial powers were less apt to invest in building inclusive
institutions since this would only increase the costs even more. Therefore, we expect these
colonies to have been characterized bymore extractive institutions, which should subsequently
be associated with institutional inclusivity in the more recent past. As we have argued above,
average protection against expropriation and comprehensive death registration capture mod-
ern institutional inclusivity, because they reflect institutional investment in economic rights,
commitment to population health, and are intricately tied to notions of citizenship and social
contract between state institutions and individuals.
In addition to this theoretical justification, the essential conditions needed to have consistent
estimation through an IV strategy are that the instrumental variable is uncorrelated with the
error term and correlated with the endogenous variable. While error terms cannot be ob-
served, it is easy to check that both settler mortality (r = -0.51) and the distance between the
major economic centre and the major port (r = -0.42) are significantly correlated with expro-
priation risk. Similarly, both settler mortality (r = -0.60) and the distance between the major
economic centre and the major port (r = -0.28) are correlated with the comprehensiveness of
death registration. However, our two instruments are not correlatedwith each other (r = 0.07).
To this end we apply a 2SLS estimation, as follows:
Institutioni =µ0 + δZi + β0log(GDPi) + γ0Xi + ηi (2)
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log(Healthi) =µ1 + α1 ̂Institutionsi + β1log(GDPi) + γ1Xi + ϵi (3)
Where Zi represents our instrumental variables (i.e., settlers’ mortality and distance in KM)
and ̂Institutions represents the fitted values of Institution estimated through equation (2).
The exclusion restriction, implied by our instrumental variable, is that: net of all the explana-
tory variables included in the regression, both mortality rates of European settlers more than
100 years (settlers’ mortality) ago and the distance from the capital city to the major port (Dis-
tance inKM) in the country during the 19th century donot have a direct effect on the outcomes:
health outcomes and health coverage. The major concern of this exclusion restriction is that
mortality rates of European settlers could be correlated with diseases that have a direct impact
on our outcome. It is possible that settler mortality rates, which were largely determined by
malaria and yellow fever, may be correlated with mortality rates in the present and so we con-
dition on the malaria infection rate – a major cause of death for both recent populations and
also settlers. Other causes of settler mortality, such as yellow fever, are far less consequential
today due to effective vaccination and treatment. However, this possible link between settler
mortality and health in the present necessitates our use of an alternative instrument for insti-
tutions. We argue that there is no direct effect of distance from the main capital city to the
major port in the 19th century on health outcomes or coverage today. While there is reason to
suspect landlocked countries fare worse economically because of their trade disadvantage, we
posit that any possible correlation with health is in fact mediated through GDP, which we are
able to control for in our model. Lastly, we argue that settler mortality is unlikely to be directly
caused by the distance of the capital city from the nearest major port and this is, in fact, what
we find (r = 0.07).
GDP: -
Another problem still remains. Institutions affect economic development, which may also af-
fect health. Conditioning on a post-treatment variable (in this case, GDP) can produce bias
(Acharya et al. 2016a) and so to address this we estimated the following models:
Institutioni =µ0 + δZi + γ0Xi + ηi (4)
log(GDPi) =µ2 + α2 ̂Institutionsi + γ1Xi + ξi (5)
In short, we estimate a two-stage least squares model with GDP as the outcome, institutions
as the endogenous variable, and our two instruments along with our control variables. This
model approximates Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson’s model but with the addition of our
extra instrument (Distance in KM). We use this approach for both measures of institutions.
We then take the residuals from each of these two versions of model 5 and generate an instru-
mentedmeasure of GDP (Log(ĜDP )) that remains correlatedwith our rawmeasure of GDP (r
= 0.34) but is, by construction, orthogonal with respect to the instruments (Settlers’ mortality
r = -0.028; Death registration r = 0.032). This instrumented measure of GDP is then included
in ourOLSmodels (see equation 1) and our IVmodels (see equations 2 and 3). Treating GDP in
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this way allows us to still control for the effect of GDP, thereby blocking other possible causal
pathways that may affect health through GDP via mechanisms unrelated to these institutions.
Crucially, by parsing out its association with institutions we thereby stop GDP acting as a col-
lider variable (Morgan and Winship 2007). As an additional check on this approach, we also
re-estimate our models – following Acharya et al. – using a g-estimation procedure (Acharya
et al. 2016a). Not only does this model avoid the problems of post-treatment bias but it also
tests whether any association between institutions and our health outcomes persists that does
not operate through GDP. Finally, we also report our results without controlling for GDP. We
find our results are consistent when using all of these approaches.
R
In table 1 we initially present results from the naïve estimation (OLS) between health and
our proxies for institutional arrangements: the average protection against expropriation risk
(panel A) and the comprehensiveness of death registration (panel B). Across all models we con-
trol for latitude, malaria infection rate, and our instrumentedmeasure of the Average LogGDP
Per Capita PPP, as shown in equation 4. Our measures of institutions are correlated with ev-
ery health outcome. Both expropriation risk and the comprehensiveness of death registra-
tion are associated with lower maternal and infant mortality, more skilled birth attendance,
greater immunization, higher out-of-pocket expenditure and lower universal coverage. We
also find, as expected, that our instrumented measure of GDP is negatively correlated with all
of the outcomes, suggesting that our residual inclusion approach has not produced counter-
intuitive findings. The measures of malaria and latitude are not consistently correlated with
health outcomes, although there is a suggestion that countries with higher malaria rates have
lower financial risk protection (UHC).
In table 2 we report the results of the first-stage regression. Here, we find that both the settler
mortality rate and the distance from themajor economic centre to the nearest port are strongly
correlated with institutional arrangements. In countries where settler mortality was higher
and where the distance to the port was further, there is, on average, less protection against the
risk of expropriation and less comprehensive death registration. Once again, our instrumented
measure of GDP is correlated with these same outcomes in the expected direction. Although
latitude was not correlated with either institutional proxy, malaria was negatively correlated
with both outcomes.
Having demonstrated that our measure of institutions both predicts our outcomes and is par-
tially explained by our instruments, we now estimate our two-stage least squares or instru-
mental variable model (see table 3). Panel A of table 3 presents the coefficients of interest using
the average protection against expropriation as the main explanatory variable while Panel B
uses, instead, the comprehensiveness of death registration in each country.
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Table 1A: OLS regressions using as main explanatory variable Average Protection against expropriation risk, 1985-1995
Maternal Neonatal Infant Under 5 Skilled Birth DPT3 Measles (MCV) OOP8 UHC9
Covariates Mortality1 Mortality2 Mortality3 Mortality4 Attended5 Coverage6 Immunization7
Average Protection against -0.77*** -0.51*** -0.57*** -0.62*** 15.56*** 6.28*** 6.90*** -8.01*** 19.37***
expropriation risk, 1985-95 (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (2.04) (1.53) (1.65) (2.29) (4.13)
Latitude -1.88*** 0.01 -0.12 -0.11 -27.62 11.02 2.92 -34.98* 30.81
(0.69) (0.52) (0.53) (0.56) (17.05) (12.74) (13.79) (19.11) (31.94)
Malaria 1.24 0.48 0.89 1.36* -3.12 7.02 6.26 -57.27** -40.21
(0.85) (0.64) (0.64) (0.69) (20.77) (15.53) (16.81) (23.28) (40.63)
Log(ĜDP ) -0.80*** -0.49*** -0.52*** -0.57*** 18.33*** 7.00*** 8.27*** -12.08*** 31.79***
(0.14) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (3.39) (2.54) (2.74) (3.80) (6.79)
Constant 10.23*** 6.10*** 7.00*** 7.59*** -18.67 39.30*** 35.91*** 104.68*** -78.50***
(0.59) (0.45) (0.45) (0.48) (14.60) (10.92) (11.81) (16.36) (28.30)
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 45
R2 0.804 0.698 0.755 0.778 0.627 0.350 0.337 0.250 0.655
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Source: Data from the World Bank and WHO for 62 former colonies covering the period
2000-2014. All the outcomes are expressed in Logarithms, except those measured as a proportion of the population. Average protection against expropriation risk is on
a scale from 0 to 10, where a higher score means more protection against expropriation of private investment by government. Log(ĜDP ) represents the residual of the
regression using the Average Log GDP Per Capita PPP, 2000-2014 as an outcome and our measures of institutions as explanatory variables the average protection
against expropriation risk, 1985-1995, both of which have been instrumented through settler mortality in logarithms and distance from capital city during the 19C to a
major port in the country (in Km).
1 - Per 100,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 2 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 3 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 4 - Per 1,000
Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 5 - % of births attended by a skilled health personnel (Latest Available Year); 6 - % of Total Population, Average (2000-2014);
7 - % of Total Population (2000-2014); 8 – Out of Pocket expenditure as % of the budget; 9 - formal health coverage as % of the population.
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Table 1B: OLS regressions using as main explanatory variable Proportion of deaths recorded
Maternal Neonatal Infant Under 5 Skilled Birth DPT3 Measles (MCV) OOP8 UHC9
Covariates Mortality1 Mortality2 Mortality3 Mortality4 Attended5 Coverage6 Immunization7
Comprehensiveness of -0.97*** -0.65*** -0.72*** -0.79*** 19.13*** 7.76*** 8.59*** -9.86*** 23.08***
death registration (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (2.47) (1.85) (1.99) (2.80) (5.30)
Latitude -1.86*** -0.05 -0.25 -0.23 -29.93* 10.70 1.10 -28.32 14.36
(0.59) (0.44) (0.46) (0.49) (16.32) (12.27) (13.15) (18.50) (32.62)
Malaria 1.27* 0.36 0.64 1.11* -7.55 6.43 2.78 -44.45** -65.22
(0.68) (0.51) (0.53) (0.56) (18.84) (14.17) (15.19) (21.36) (40.95)
Log(ĜDP ) -0.49*** -0.29*** -0.36*** -0.39*** 14.78*** 5.68** 5.16* -5.96 20.93***
(0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (3.39) (2.55) (2.73) (3.84) (6.74)
Constant 6.15*** 3.41*** 4.03*** 4.33*** 64.99*** 72.80*** 73.21*** 59.59*** 30.43***
(0.18) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (5.09) (3.83) (4.11) (5.77) (9.93)
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 45
R2 0.852 0.767 0.804 0.824 0.635 0.356 0.356 0.249 0.618
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Source: Data from the World Bank and WHO for 62 former colonies covering the period
2000-2014. All the outcomes are expressed in Logarithms, except those measured as a proportion of the population. Countries are coded as 1 on our measure of the
Comprehensiveness of death registration is measured on a 4-point scale as described in the paper. Log(ĜDP ) represents the residual of the regression using the
Average Log GDP Per Capita PPP, 2000-2014 as an outcome and our measures of institutions as explanatory variables the average protection against expropriation
risk, 1985-1995, both of which have been instrumented through settler mortality in logarithms and distance from capital city during the 19C to a major port in the
country (in Km).
1 - Per 100,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 2 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 3 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 4 - Per 1,000 Live
Births, Average (2000-2014); 5 - % of births attended by a skilled health personnel (Latest Available Year); 6 - % of Total Population, Average (2000-2014); 7 - % of
Total Population (2000-2014); 8 – Out of Pocket expenditure as % of the budget; 9 - formal health coverage as % of the population.
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Table 2: First stage regression models
Average Protection against Comprehensiveness
expropriation risk, 1985-1995 of death registration
Covariates (1) (2)
European settler mortality (log) -0.47*** -0.39***
(0.11) (0.09)












Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Source: Data from the
World Bank and WHO for 62 former colonies covering the period 2000-2014. Average protection
against expropriation risk is on a scale from 0 to 10, where a higher score means more protection
against expropriation of private investment by government. Comprehensiveness of death registration
is measured on a 4-point scale as described in the paper. Distance refers to the distance from capital
city during the 19C to a major port in the country (per 100 Km). Log(ĜDP ) represents the residual
of the regression using the Average Log GDP Per Capita PPP, 2000-2014 as an outcome and our
measures of institutions as explanatory variables the average protection against expropriation risk,
1985-1995, both of which have been instrumented through settler mortality in logarithms and
distance from capital city during the 19C to a major port in the country (in Km).
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Table 3A: IV Regression using as main explanatory variable Average Protection against expropriation risk, 1985-1995
Maternal Neonatal Infant Under 5 Skilled Birth DPT3 Measles (MCV) OOP8 UHC9
IV Results Mortality1 Mortality2 Mortality3 Mortality4 Attended5 Coverage6 Immunization7
Average protection against -1.02** -0.68** -0.75** -0.84** 16.16** 9.78** 9.81** -11.40** 25.28**
expropriation risk, 1985-95 (0.15) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (3.45) (2.69) (2.87) (3.94) (7.82)
Latitude -1.52 0.25 0.13 0.20 -28.45 6.12 -1.16 -30.24 17.15
(0.77) (0.57) (0.58) (0.63) (17.50) (13.66) (14.53) (19.97) (36.10)
Malaria -0.16 -0.46 -0.11 0.17 0.16 26.29 22.28 -75.93* -8.96
(1.13) (0.84) (0.86) (0.93) (25.82) (20.15) (21.43) (29.46) (54.28)
Log(ĜDP ) -1.10** -0.69** -0.73** -0.83** 19.03** 11.14** 11.71** -16.08** 38.84**
(0.21) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (4.72) (3.69) (3.92) (5.39) (10.50)
Constant 11.96** 7.26** 8.24** 9.06** -22.71 15.53 16.14 127.70** -117.11*
(1.05) (0.78) (0.79) (0.86) (23.88) (18.64) (19.82) (27.25) (51.88)
R2 0.772 0.659 0.720 0.739 0.626 0.290 0.301 0.221 0.638
OLS results
Average Protection against -0.77*** -0.51*** -0.57*** -0.62*** 15.56*** 6.28*** 6.90*** -8.01*** 19.37***
expropriation risk, 1985-95 (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (2.04) (1.53) (1.65) (2.29) (4.13)
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 45
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Source: Data from the World Bank and WHO for 62 former colonies covering the period
2000-2014. All the outcomes are expressed in Logarithms, except those measured as a proportion of the population. Average protection against expropriation risk is on
a scale from 0 to 10, where a higher score means more protection against expropriation of private investment by government. Log(ĜDP ) represents the residual of the
regression using the Average Log GDP Per Capita PPP, 2000-2014 as an outcome and our measures of institutions as explanatory variables the average protection
against expropriation risk, 1985-1995, both of which have been instrumented through settler mortality in logarithms and distance from capital city during the 19C to a
major port in the country (in Km).
1 - Per 100,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 2 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 3 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 4 - Per 1,000
Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 5 - % of births attended by a skilled health personnel (Latest Available Year); 6 - % of Total Population, Average (2000-2014);
7 - % of Total Population (2000-2014); 8 – Out of Pocket expenditure as % of the budget; 9 - formal health coverage as % of the population.
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Table 3B: IV Regression using as main explanatory variable Proportion of deaths recorded
Maternal Neonatal Infant Under 5 Skilled Birth DPT3 Measles (MCV) OOP8 UHC9
Covariates Mortality1 Mortality2 Mortality3 Mortality4 Attended5 Coverage6 Immunization7
Comprehensiveness of -1.23*** -0.84*** -0.94*** -1.04*** 18.94*** 11.61*** 11.31*** -12.05** 26.65**
death registration (0.16) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (4.16) (3.24) (3.41) (4.74) (9.93)
Latitude -1.54** 0.18 0.01 0.08 -29.68* 5.92 -2.29 -25.59 7.28
(0.65) (0.49) (0.51) (0.55) (16.84) (13.13) (13.80) (19.20) (36.77)
Malaria 0.14 -0.44 -0.28 0.03 -8.39 23.02 14.53 -53.89* -50.28
(0.91) (0.69) (0.72) (0.78) (23.75) (18.51) (19.45) (27.07) (54.08)
Log(ĜDP ) -0.71*** -0.45*** -0.54*** -0.61*** 14.62*** 8.95** 7.48** -7.82 24.00**
(0.17) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (4.42) (3.45) (3.62) (5.04) (9.88)
Constant 6.45*** 3.62*** 4.28*** 4.62*** 65.21*** 68.34*** 70.05*** 62.13*** 27.00**
(0.25) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (6.41) (5.00) (5.25) (7.30) (12.82)
R2 0.829 0.736 0.771 0.789 0.635 0.308 0.335 0.241 0.613
OLS Results
Comprehensiveness of -0.97*** -0.65*** -0.72*** -0.79*** 19.13*** 7.76*** 8.59*** -9.86*** 23.08***
death registration (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (2.47) (1.85) (1.99) (2.80) (5.30)
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 45
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Source: Data from the World Bank and WHO for 62 former colonies covering the period
2000-2014. All the outcomes are expressed in Logarithms, except those measured as a proportion of the population. Countries are coded as 1 on our measure of the
Comprehensiveness of death registration is measured on a 4-point scale as described in the paper. Log(ĜDP ) represents the residual of the regression using the
Average Log GDP Per Capita PPP, 2000-2014 as an outcome and our measures of institutions as explanatory variables the average protection against expropriation
risk, 1985-1995, both of which have been instrumented through settler mortality in logarithms and distance from capital city during the 19C to a major port in the
country (in Km).
1 - Per 100,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 2 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 3 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 4 - Per 1,000 Live
Births, Average (2000-2014); 5 - % of births attended by a skilled health personnel (Latest Available Year); 6 - % of Total Population, Average (2000-2014); 7 - % of
Total Population (2000-2014); 8 – Out of Pocket expenditure as % of the budget; 9 - formal health coverage as % of the population.
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Our 2SLS estimation shows that an increase of 1 point in the average expropriation rate leads
to significant reduction in maternal (1.02 percentage points) and infant mortality (0.68 per-
centage points with respect to neonatal mortality and 0.75 percentage points with respect to
infant mortality and 0.84 percentage points with respect to under 5 mortality rates), increases
in skilled birth attendance (16.16 percentage points), greater immunization (9.78 percentage
points with respect to DPT3 coverage and 9.81 with respect to measles), lower out-of-pocket
expenditure (11.4 percentage points) and higher universal coverage (25.3 percentage points).
Consistent with these findings, when we re-estimate the models using the comprehensiveness
of death registration as an alternative proxy for institutional arrangements we find the direc-
tion of the results are identical. To be precise, moving up a category on our ordinal scale of the
comprehensiveness of death registration is associated with a significant reduction in mater-
nal (1.23 percentage points) and infant mortality (0.84 percentage points with respect neonatal
mortality and 0.94 percentage pointswith respect to infantmortality and 1.04 percentage point
with respect to under 5 mortality), increase skilled birth attendance (18.94 percentage points),
greater immunization (11.61 percentage points with respect to DPT3 coverage and 11.30 with
respect toMeasles), lower out-of-pocket expenditure (12.05 percentage points) and higher uni-
versal coverage (26.65 percentage points).
R
The validity of the 2SLS estimation we deploy here is based on the assumption that none of
the instruments have a direct effect on the outcome. However, LaPorta et al. (1999), Mahoney
(2010) and Lange (2004) have all argued that the specific colonizer may have been a determi-
nant of institutions; more specifically the authors suggest that British colonies inherit better
institutions because Britain colonized places where settlements were possible. To investigate
if our results are driven by the difference between British colonizers and others we restrict
our analysis to British colonies only. Table 4 presents the estimated results, which are broadly
consistent with the main results. There are two exceptions; both out of pocket expenditure
and percentage of total population covered by DPT3 vaccine become insignificant when using
the comprehensiveness of death registration as an instrument but the sign remains in the same
direction.
We also explore whether our results are sensitive to the set of controls we include in our main
models. For example, we re-estimate our IV models but without controlling for GDP, finding
almost exactly the same results (Table 5). We also re-estimate our models controlling for other
possible predictors of our health outcomes: total health spending, both public and private (%
of GDP); indicators of the colonizer (British, Spanish, and French, with a catch-all category
for other colonies); the degree of democracy between 2000-2014 (Freedom House’s measure
of political rights and civil liberties); the level of official development assistance (% of gov-
ernment spending); and a measure of economic globalization (KOF). We do not include these
variables in our main models in part due to sample size and in part because there is good evi-
dence that, like GDP, these variables sit on the causal pathway between institutions and health,
and would potentially bias our results. However, even when we control for these variables,
our two measures of institutions remain correlated with our measures of health outcomes in
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almost all instances (see Web Appendix 3).
We also re-estimate our main instrumental regression models using a g-estimation procedure
(see Table 6) (Acharya et al. 2016a). The g-estimation procedures ‘transforms (or demediates)
the dependent variable by removing from it the effect of the mediator and then estimating the
effect of the treatment on this demediated outcome’ (Acharya et al. 2016a). In other words,
these models enable us to address the issue of post-treatment bias that may be introduced by
controlling directly for GDP and allow us to test whether the correlation between institutions
and health is solely explained by their connection with GDP. The procedure moves through
three-steps, which we apply to our specific case:
1. Estimate the main instrumental variable regression models with health outcomes as our
dependent variable and controlling for GDP.
2. Create a de-mediated version of the dependent variable where we have subtracted the
effect of GDP from each health outcome.
3. Re-estimate the main instrumental variable regression model again but with two differ-
ences: i) use the de-mediated version of the dependent variable and ii) do not include the
measure of GDP.
We report the results from these models below for both endogenous variables. We find that
most of our results are largely unchanged. But there are some exceptions. For example, the
association with skilled birth attendance is weaker and in those models using the average risk
of expropriation as the endogenous variables, the results are less clear for our measure of UHC
and out-of-pocket spending.
If development alone is not the explanation then perhaps health spending explains the connec-
tion between institutions and health outcomes. Using the same g-estimation procedure, we
now create a de-mediated version of the dependent variable where we have subtracted both
the effect of GDP and total health spending from each health outcome. Running our IV mod-
els on this new dependent variable (see Web Appendix 4), we still find our results are largely
consistent with our original IV models and our OLS estimates, except for skilled birth atten-
dance (which, again, is not significant at standard levels anymore). Taken together our results
do not appear to be especially sensitive to our particular model specification nor does it seem
that GDP is the only pathway between institutions and health. Other mechanisms appear to
be at work.
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Table 4A: IV Regression using as main explanatory variable Average Protection against expropriation risk, 1985-1995, British colonies only
Maternal Neonatal Infant Under 5 Skilled Birth DPT3 Measles (MCV) OOP8 UHC9
IV Results Mortality1 Mortality2 Mortality3 Mortality4 Attended5 Coverage6 Immunization7
Average protection against -1.25*** -1.00*** -1.04*** -1.12*** 25.52*** 11.61** 13.11** -21.29*** 31.46*
expropriation risk, 1985-95 (0.24) (0.18) (0.20) (0.21) (6.16) (4.97) (4.87) (6.67) (14.88)
Latitude -1.54 0.63 0.62 0.61 -12.72 -12.44 -16.96 -69.92** 73.61
(1.17) (0.85) (0.93) (1.00) (29.43) (23.71) (23.27) (31.84) (104.11)
Malaria -1.68 -2.58 -2.16 -2.07 90.52 46.56 61.91 -197.51*** 146.73
(2.24) (1.64) (1.79) (1.91) (56.52) (45.54) (44.68) (61.14) (111.70)
Log(ĜDP ) -1.47*** -1.12*** -1.13*** -1.23*** 29.26*** 12.56 14.09* -31.60*** 32.81
(0.40) (0.29) (0.32) (0.34) (9.99) (8.05) (7.90) (10.81) (21.01)
Constant 13.75*** 9.62*** 10.41*** 11.22*** -104.82** 3.11 -9.86 221.00*** -208.23*
(1.91) (1.40) (1.53) (1.63) (48.11) (38.77) (38.04) (52.05) (97.23)
R2 0.856 0.806 0.801 0.808 0.594 0.0559 0.0675 0.349 0.659
OLS results
Average Protection against -0.97*** -0.81*** -0.81*** -0.85*** 17.77*** 5.08* 6.21** -12.92*** 20.12*
expropriation risk, 1985-95 (0.15) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (3.66) (2.92) (2.80) (3.96) (10.52)
N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 14
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Source: Data from the World Bank and WHO for 62 former colonies covering the period
2000-2014. All the outcomes are expressed in Logarithms, except those measured as a proportion of the population. Average protection against expropriation risk is on
a scale from 0 to 10, where a higher score means more protection against expropriation of private investment by government. Log(ĜDP ) represents the residual of the
regression using the Average Log GDP Per Capita PPP, 2000-2014 as an outcome and our measures of institutions as explanatory variables the average protection
against expropriation risk, 1985-1995, both of which have been instrumented through settler mortality in logarithms and distance from capital city during the 19C to a
major port in the country (in Km).
1 - Per 100,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 2 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 3 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 4 - Per 1,000
Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 5 - % of births attended by a skilled health personnel (Latest Available Year); 6 - % of Total Population, Average (2000-2014);
7 - % of Total Population (2000-2014); 8 – Out of Pocket expenditure as % of the budget; 9 - formal health coverage as % of the population.
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Table 4B: IV Regression using as main explanatory variable Proportion of deaths recorded, British colonies only
Maternal Neonatal Infant Under 5 Skilled Birth DPT3 Measles (MCV) OOP8 UHC9
Covariates Mortality1 Mortality2 Mortality3 Mortality4 Attended5 Coverage6 Immunization7
Comprehensiveness of -1.42*** -1.16*** -1.17*** -1.24*** 31.77*** 11.65 14.71** -12.60 53.38*
death registration (0.35) (0.26) (0.27) (0.28) (9.38) (6.93) (7.04) (8.28) (24.06)
Latitude -1.33 0.67 0.62 0.66 -12.38 -14.14 -16.90 -40.36 74.58
(1.02) (0.76) (0.80) (0.83) (27.30) (20.17) (20.50) (24.11) (97.33)
Malaria -0.79 -2.20 -1.57 -1.25 95.10 29.70 54.76 -77.57 229.29*
(2.37) (1.76) (1.85) (1.92) (63.40) (46.85) (47.62) (55.98) (114.96)
Log(ĜDP ) -1.19* -0.97* -0.85 -0.86 31.26* 5.60 10.51 4.15 97.27*
(0.65) (0.48) (0.51) (0.53) (17.42) (12.88) (13.09) (15.39) (43.73)
_cons 6.83*** 4.17*** 4.64*** 4.96*** 29.78 70.55*** 62.61*** 72.42*** -67.19*
(0.76) (0.56) (0.59) (0.62) (20.33) (15.02) (15.27) (17.95) (34.73)
R2 0.868 0.818 0.828 0.842 0.583 0.185 0.136 0.555 0.703
OLS Results
Comprehensiveness of -1.08*** -0.92*** -0.89*** -0.92*** 20.26*** 3.75 5.52 -9.26* 33.34**
death registration (0.19) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (4.76) (3.59) (3.51) (4.72) (12.28)
N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 14
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Source: Data from the World Bank and WHO for 62 former colonies covering the period
2000-2014. All the outcomes are expressed in Logarithms, except those measured as a proportion of the population. Countries are coded as 1 on our measure of the
Comprehensiveness of death registration is measured on a 4-point scale as described in the paper. Log(ĜDP ) represents the residual of the regression using the
Average Log GDP Per Capita PPP, 2000-2014 as an outcome and our measures of institutions as explanatory variables the average protection against expropriation
risk, 1985-1995, both of which have been instrumented through settler mortality in logarithms and distance from capital city during the 19C to a major port in the
country (in Km).
1 - Per 100,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 2 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 3 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 4 - Per 1,000 Live
Births, Average (2000-2014); 5 - % of births attended by a skilled health personnel (Latest Available Year); 6 - % of Total Population, Average (2000-2014); 7 - % of
Total Population (2000-2014); 8 – Out of Pocket expenditure as % of the budget; 9 - formal health coverage as % of the population.
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Table 5A: IV Regression using as main explanatory variable Average Protection against expropriation risk, 1985-1995, without adjusting for GDP
Maternal Neonatal Infant Under 5 Skilled Birth DPT3 Measles (MCV) OOP8 UHC9
IV Results Mortality1 Mortality2 Mortality3 Mortality4 Attended5 Coverage6 Immunization7
Average protection against -0.71*** -0.49*** -0.55*** -0.61*** 10.98*** 6.77*** 6.59*** -6.97** 13.42*
expropriation risk, 1985-95 (0.14) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (3.06) (2.08) (2.23) (3.08) (6.90)
Latitude -0.57 0.84 0.77 0.92 -45.74* -4.07 -11.65 -15.85 0.58
(1.06) (0.73) (0.75) (0.83) (23.19) (15.72) (16.86) (23.33) (49.06)
Malaria 4.04*** 2.18*** 2.68*** 3.32*** -72.02*** -15.92 -22.19 -14.83 -128.52***
(0.91) (0.63) (0.65) (0.71) (20.00) (13.56) (14.54) (20.12) (45.97)
Constant 9.34*** 5.61*** 6.51*** 7.10*** 21.10 41.05*** 43.33*** 90.31*** -26.72
(0.87) (0.60) (0.62) (0.68) (19.13) (12.97) (13.91) (19.25) (42.15)
R2 0.607 0.488 0.566 0.586 0.402 0.141 0.141 0.0298 0.396
OLS results
Average Protection against -0.77*** -0.51*** -0.57*** -0.62*** 15.56*** 6.28*** 6.90*** -8.01*** 19.37***
expropriation risk, 1985-95 (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (2.04) (1.53) (1.65) (2.29) (4.13)
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 45
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Source: Data from the World Bank and WHO for 62 former colonies covering the period
2000-2014. All the outcomes are expressed in Logarithms, except those measured as a proportion of the population. Average protection against expropriation risk is on
a scale from 0 to 10, where a higher score means more protection against expropriation of private investment by government.
1 - Per 100,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 2 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 3 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 4 - Per 1,000
Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 5 - % of births attended by a skilled health personnel (Latest Available Year); 6 - % of Total Population, Average (2000-2014);
7 - % of Total Population (2000-2014); 8 – Out of Pocket expenditure as % of the budget; 9 - formal health coverage as % of the population.
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Table 5B: IV Regression using as main explanatory variable Proportion of deaths recorded, without adjusting for GDP
Maternal Neonatal Infant Under 5 Skilled Birth DPT3 Measles (MCV) OOP8 UHC9
Covariates Mortality1 Mortality2 Mortality3 Mortality4 Attended5 Coverage6 Immunization7
Comprehensiveness of -1.15*** -0.78*** -0.86*** -0.95*** 16.36*** 9.95*** 10.10*** -10.93** 27.63**
death registration (0.18) (0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (4.29) (3.07) (3.15) (4.29) (12.13)
Latitude -1.47* 0.22 0.04 0.11 -29.86 5.94 -2.53 -25.13 5.94
(0.82) (0.58) (0.62) (0.68) (19.85) (14.21) (14.59) (19.85) (45.77)
Malaria 1.14 0.20 0.53 0.95 -31.89 8.33 2.85 -42.19* -62.32
(0.96) (0.68) (0.73) (0.80) (23.36) (16.71) (17.17) (23.36) (61.80)
Constant 6.26*** 3.50*** 4.12*** 4.44*** 70.03*** 71.38*** 72.41*** 59.82*** 27.54*
(0.27) (0.19) (0.21) (0.23) (6.64) (4.75) (4.88) (6.64) (15.43)
R2 0.725 0.627 0.653 0.671 0.487 0.180 0.248 0.179 0.372
OLS Results
Comprehensiveness of -0.97*** -0.65*** -0.72*** -0.79*** 19.13*** 7.76*** 8.59*** -9.86*** 23.08***
death registration (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (2.47) (1.85) (1.99) (2.80) (5.30)
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 45
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Source: Data from the World Bank and WHO for 62 former colonies covering the period
2000-2014. All the outcomes are expressed in Logarithms, except those measured as a proportion of the population. Countries are coded as 1 on our measure of the
Comprehensiveness of death registration is measured on a 4-point scale as described in the paper.
1 - Per 100,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 2 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 3 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 4 - Per 1,000 Live
Births, Average (2000-2014); 5 - % of births attended by a skilled health personnel (Latest Available Year); 6 - % of Total Population, Average (2000-2014); 7 - % of
Total Population (2000-2014); 8 – Out of Pocket expenditure as % of the budget; 9 - formal health coverage as % of the population.
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Table 6A: IV Regression using a g-estimation procedure using as main explanatory variable Average Protection against expropriation risk, 1985-1995
Maternal Neonatal Infant Under 5 Skilled Birth DPT3 Measles (MCV) OOP8 UHC9
IV Results Mortality1 Mortality2 Mortality3 Mortality4 Attended5 Coverage6 Immunization7
Average protection against -0.55*** -0.41*** -0.48*** -0.56*** 0.67 8.40*** 6.07*** -4.76 -2.07
expropriation risk, 1985-95 (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (2.43) (2.21) (2.19) (2.94) (5.39)
Latitude -0.81 0.73 0.67 0.85 -30.31 -6.51 -10.87 -19.17 13.92
(0.93) (0.68) (0.71) (0.79) (18.36) (16.70) (16.58) (22.22) (38.32)
Malaria 3.04*** 1.69*** 2.28*** 3.03*** -7.91 -26.06* -18.95 -28.61 -49.52
(0.81) (0.58) (0.61) (0.68) (15.84) (14.40) (14.30) (19.16) (35.91)
Constant 10.72*** 6.28*** 7.06*** 7.50*** -66.64*** 54.92*** 38.91*** 109.16*** -159.86***
(0.77) (0.56) (0.58) (0.65) (15.15) (13.78) (13.68) (18.33) (32.92)
R2 0.539 0.406 0.520 0.560 0.0467 0.257 0.105 0.030 0.111
OLS results
Average Protection against -0.77*** -0.51*** -0.57*** -0.62*** 15.56*** 6.28*** 6.90*** -8.01*** 19.37***
expropriation risk, 1985-95 (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (2.04) (1.53) (1.65) (2.29) (4.13)
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 45
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Source: Data from the World Bank and WHO for 62 former colonies covering the period
2000-2014. All the outcomes are expressed in Logarithms, except those measured as a proportion of the population. Average protection against expropriation risk is on
a scale from 0 to 10, where a higher score means more protection against expropriation of private investment by government.
1 - Per 100,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 2 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 3 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 4 - Per 1,000
Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 5 - % of births attended by a skilled health personnel (Latest Available Year); 6 - % of Total Population, Average (2000-2014);
7 - % of Total Population (2000-2014); 8 – Out of Pocket expenditure as % of the budget; 9 - formal health coverage as % of the population.
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Table 6B: IV Regression using a g-estimation procedure using as main explanatory variable Proportion of deaths recorded
Maternal Neonatal Infant Under 5 Skilled Birth DPT3 Measles (MCV) OOP8 UHC9
Covariates Mortality1 Mortality2 Mortality3 Mortality4 Attended5 Coverage6 Immunization7
Comprehensiveness of -1.51*** -1.05*** -1.05*** -1.17*** 2.20 10.54*** 10.96*** -11.51** 27.77**
death registration (0.22) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (3.63) (3.11) (3.21) (4.32) (12.16)
Latitude -1.47 0.22 0.05 0.12 -29.58* 5.93 -2.55 -25.12 5.97
(1.02) (0.71) (0.72) (0.80) (16.77) (14.41) (14.85) (19.99) (45.86)
Malaria 1.79 0.67 0.87 1.35 -6.77 7.27 1.31 -41.17* -62.48
(1.20) (0.84) (0.85) (0.94) (19.73) (16.95) (17.47) (23.51) (61.92)
Constant 3.05*** 1.18*** 2.44*** 2.49*** -54.62*** 76.63*** 80.05*** 54.76*** 28.69*
(0.34) (0.24) (0.24) (0.27) (5.61) (4.82) (4.96) (6.68) (15.46)
R2 0.747 0.688 0.691 0.705 0.0751 0.210 0.286 0.193 0.373
OLS Results
Comprehensiveness of -0.97*** -0.65*** -0.72*** -0.79*** 19.13*** 7.76*** 8.59*** -9.86*** 23.08***
death registration (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (2.47) (1.85) (1.99) (2.80) (5.30)
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 45
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Source: Data from the World Bank and WHO for 62 former colonies covering the period
2000-2014. All the outcomes are expressed in Logarithms, except those measured as a proportion of the population. Countries are coded as 1 on our measure of the
Comprehensiveness of death registration is measured on a 4-point scale as described in the paper.
1 - Per 100,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 2 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 3 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 4 - Per 1,000 Live
Births, Average (2000-2014); 5 - % of births attended by a skilled health personnel (Latest Available Year); 6 - % of Total Population, Average (2000-2014); 7 - % of
Total Population (2000-2014); 8 – Out of Pocket expenditure as % of the budget; 9 - formal health coverage as % of the population.
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Since the turn of the century there has been a proliferation of studies examining the role of
institutions in shaping economic development and political systems. (Acemoglu et al. 2014;
Banerjee and Duflo 2014). But far less attention has been given to how institutions shape the
development of health systems, health outcomes, and, in particular, universal health coverage
(Pega et al. 2013). This study moves this debate forward by examining how institutional ar-
rangements inherited from the colonial period (such as extractive and inclusive institutions)
are associated with the development of strong health systems capable of delivering univer-
sal health coverage today. Moreover, recognizing the challenges with identifying the causal
effect of institutions on health, we have used an instrumental variable approach to more pre-
cisely identify the link between institutions and population health. We argue that i) European
powers adopted very different colonization strategies, which were determined by the costs as-
sociated with colonization; ii) that both completeness of registration systems and the risk of
expropriation are features of inclusive institutional formation; and, finally, iii) institutions are
path dependent, namely that the institutional arrangements established during the colonial era
continue to shape the institution arrangements in the present.
Our paper moves these debates forward in four respects. Earlier analyses of the health ef-
fects of colonial legacies have examined a narrow range of health outcomes in a limited set
of countries (i.e., Spanish America). We expand the range of health outcomes studied, finding
largely consistent correlations between institutions and mortality, vaccination coverage, and
universal health coverage, and we include a much wider set of countries, suggesting the form
of colonialism is correlated with health outcomes many decades later across countries from
very different regions. This reinforces Mahoney’s (2010) argument that any geographic effects
on social development (including health) depend on the arrangement of existing institutions.
We also move beyond the focus on contemporary economic institutions alone, and explicitly
address health-related institutions too. Specifically, we pay particular attention to death reg-
istration, an institutional arrangement that potentially drives health improvements and which
has now been incorporated in the SDGs. This innovation expands the range of possible insti-
tutions that may have their roots in colonialism.
Fourth, we also seek to address the endogeneity between institutions, GDP, and health through
our IV approach and g-estimation. Building on earlier work, we too observe that current insti-
tutional arrangements are correlated with the costs of colonization in the past. Extractive in-
stitutions today are more common among countries where settler mortality rates were higher
and where the distance between the main economic centre and the nearest major port during
the nineteenth century was farther. Crucially, when we control for the endogeneity between
institutions and health in the present (using settler mortality and distance as instruments) we
find that health outcomes are better in countries withmore inclusive institutions such as better
protection against expropriation and more comprehensive death registration. This relation-
ship holds even when using a variety of methods to control for the endogeneity in the wealth-
health association. The relationship between institutions and health is also not explained by
environmental diseases (i.e. malaria) or latitude, or by other factors like official development
assistance, democracy, economic globalization, colonizer, or total health spending. While we
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do not claim to have entirely resolved the thorny entanglement of health and wealth, the con-
sistency of our results across our models gives us greater confidence in our findings.
Interestingly, and similar to earlier studies (Acemoglu et al. 2001), the estimated coefficients
using the 2SLS approach are similar to but larger than the OLS estimates reported in Table 2.
One possible explanation is that our proxy measures of institutional arrangements contain a
great deal of measurement error, which is large enough to counteract the upward bias intro-
duced by reverse causality or omitted variables. But this seems unlikely in this context given
that we see an inflated IV coefficient for both of our instruments. It is also possible that neg-
ative selection may explain why the OLS estimates are lower than the IV estimates, especially
if the effect of institutions on health varies across contexts. For example, if the effect of inclu-
sive institutions on health is actually greater for those countries that are more likely to have
inclusive institutions then the OLS estimate would be larger than the IV estimate. However, if
the reverse is true – namely that the health effects of inclusive institutions would actually be
greater for those countries least likely to have them – then the IV estimates may actually be
larger than the OLS estimates. Our results, therefore, suggest that not only have extractive in-
stitutions harmed the ability of some countries to develop strong and effective health systems
but that these extractive institutions have actually been more harmful in these contexts than
they would have been elsewhere.
There are several important limitations to our work. First, ourmeasures of institutions are not
perfect proxies for all the institutional arrangements that may influence health. Yet, our work
still moves our understanding of institutions forward by identifying a new health-related in-
stitutional arrangement – namely the comprehensiveness of death registrations –which is also
foundational to the extension of individual rights, including property rights. Second, ourmea-
sures of universal health coverage and health systems do not capture every important aspect
of health. However, our findings have a high degree of consistency across health indicators,
including mortality rates, immunization rates, and financial protection against catastrophic
costs, suggesting the health effects of institutions are not narrowly relevant to only a few out-
comes. Third, we assume the form of colonization that flowed from settler mortality and the
distance between a major port and the capital city was largely stable and so overlooks how
colonial influence varied over time (Thelen 2003). This is also one of the strengths of our
paper because this assumption explicitly acknowledges the path dependence between initial
conditions, the colonial institutions installed, and the level of social development that we see
today (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Pierson 2000). Better data will be required to ex-
plore changing institutional forms. Fourth, our measure of distance to the closest major port
only partly takes into account the topography and availability of other forms of connection
(e.g. availability of rail connections). This choice was mainly driven by the paucity of data in
this area and this is clearly an area of future research. In short, although our analyses are not
without their limitations, our results are plausible and highly consistent, suggesting that insti-
tutions may play an important role in health system development and in reducing mortality.
It is easy to read these results as a form of historical determinism, that the past shapes the
present and there is little that can be done to change the future (Banerjee and Duflo 2014). It
is important to be clear about what our findings do and do not imply in this respect. First, our
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results reveal a correlation between institutions and health along with the presence of some
degree of path dependence between institutional formation in the past and the present. Our
models do not necessarily imply, however, that such an association must always persist, just
that it remains at this point in time. Second, the influence of the past on the present is not
fixed and it is likely that the influence of any particular historical moment changes over time.
It is not clear whether and how colonial legacies will still matter 100 years from now. Third,
instrumental variable models identify only a part of the causal effect; that part of variation in
the cause (institutions) that is due to the instrument (i.e., settler mortality and distance) (Dun-
ning 2008). This is not a purely technical issue. Institutions are not just the product of settler
mortality and distance to the nearest major port from the economic centre and so changes in
these other drivers of institutions may affect health quite differently (Dunning 2008). In part,
this is because, despite what is implied by instrumental variable models, institutions are not
simply devices that produce better health or more economic development; they are ‘power-
implicating instruments’ (Mahoney 2010) that constrain and enable different capabilities de-
pending on how they are embedded within and interact with other institutional forms.
One highly salient, but largely unexplored example of this issue is the role of international
financial institutions. These organizations may bend the trajectories established by colonial
legacies and, in some cases, may even create ‘critical junctures’ that set these countries and their
institutions on new paths (Thelen 2003). There is still debate concerning whether, how, and
under what circumstances international financial institutions affect health, with some docu-
menting negative effects (Coburn, Restivo, and Shandra 2015; Daoud et al. 2017; Kentikelenis
2017; Stuckler et al. 2008) and others suggesting their influence on health is largely positive or
at least benign (Gupta 2015, 2017). More recent work, has illuminated how the impact of these
international organizations may be contingent on the institutional forms already established
within countries. For example, Noy (2017) finds that the World Bank’s influence of health in
Latin America is not monolithic but rather responds to national contexts, sometimes in the
service of fostering equity and universalism. Similarly, Barlow (2018) documents how trade
liberalization – as promoted by the WTO, IMF, and World Bank – may reduce infant mortal-
ity in low – and middle-income countries but only in contexts where the existing institutional
arrangements can translate the economic benefits of trade into pro-poor growth. More work
is needed to understand how national-level institutions (such as death registration, but also fe-
male political representation, among many others) (Quamruzzaman and Lange 2016; Szreter
2007) both create the conditions for improvements in health and interact with other institu-
tions and organizations in pursuing these goals (Shandra et al. 2004).
Our results also have important implications for progress toward the SDGs. Institutional ar-
rangements can accelerate or hinder development and our models suggest that inclusive in-
stitutions, such as reducing expropriation risks or establishing legal identities, may form an
important part of institutional rules that will protect health and facilitate the creation of ro-
bust and resilient health systems that are able to respond to health shocks, such as the spread
of Ebola. While our analysis does not directly establish that the spread of this specific disease
would have been different if inclusive rather than extractive institutions had been established
during the nineteenth century in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea; it does suggest that such
countries will remain vulnerable to health shocks if institutions are not established that can
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provide a thorough and robust response to as yet unknown diseases.
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Web Appendix 1: Former European Colonies
Country Colonizer Region Included Country Colonizer Region Included
in sample in sample
Algeria France Africa Yes Madagascar France Africa Yes
Angola Portugal Africa Yes Malawi Britain Africa No
Antigua and
Barbuda
Britain Americas No Malaysia Britain Asia Yes
Argentina Spain Americas Yes Maldives Britain Asia No
Australia Britain Oceania Yes Mali France Africa Yes
Bahamas Britain Americas Yes Malta Britain Europe Yes
Bahrain Britain Asia No Marshall
Islands
Spain Oceania No
Bangladesh Britain Asia Yes Mauritania France Africa No
Barbados Britain Americas No Mauritius Britain Africa No
Belize Britain Americas No Mexico Spain Americas Yes
Benin France Africa No Micronesia Spain Oceania No
Bolivia Spain Americas Yes Morocco France Africa Yes
Botswana Britain Africa No Mozambique Portugal Africa No
Brazil Portugal Americas Yes Myanmar Britain Asia No
Brunei Britain Asia No Namibia Germany Africa No
Burkina Faso France Africa Yes Nauru Britain Oceania No
Burundi Belgium Africa No Nepal Britain Asia No
Cambodia France Asia No New Zealand Britain Oceania Yes
Cameroon France Africa Yes Nicaragua Spain Americas Yes
Canada Britain Americas Yes Niger France Africa Yes




France Africa No Pakistan Britain Asia Yes
Chad France Africa No Palau Spain Oceania No
Chile Spain Americas Yes Palestine Britain Asia No
Colombia Spain Americas Yes Panama Spain Americas Yes





France Africa Yes Paraguay Spain Americas Yes
Costa Rica Spain Americas Yes Peru Spain Americas Yes
Ivory Coast France Africa Yes Philippones Spain Asia No
Cuba Spain Americas No Qatar Britain Asia No
Cyprus Britain Asia No Rwanda Belgium Africa No
Djibouti France Africa No Saint Kitts and
Nevis
Britain Americas No
Dominica Britain Americas No Saint Lucia Britain Americas No
Dominican
Republic




DRC Belgium Africa Yes Samoa Britain Oceania No
Ecuador Spain Americas Yes Sao Tome and
Principe
Portugal Africa No
Egypt Britain Africa Yes Senegal France Africa Yes
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El Salvador Spain Americas Yes Seychelles Britain Africa No
Equatorial
Guinea
Spain Africa No Sierra Leone Britain Africa Yes
Fiji Britain Oceania No Singapore Britain Asia Yes
Gabon France Africa Yes Solomon
Islands
Britain Oceania No
Gambia Britain Africa Yes Somalia Britain Africa No
Ghana Britain Africa Yes South Africa Britain Africa Yes
Grenada Britain Americas No South Sudan Britain Africa No
Guatemala Spain Americas Yes Sri Lanka Britain Asia Yes
Guinea France Africa Yes Sudan Britain Africa Yes
Guinea-Bissau Portugal Africa No Suriname Netherlands Americas No
Guyana Britain Americas Yes Swaziland Britain Africa No
Haiti France Americas Yes Tanzania Britain Africa Yes
Honduras Spain Americas Yes Timor-Leste Portugal Asia No
India Britain Asia Yes Togo France Africa Yes
Indonesia Netherlands Asia Yes Tonga Britain Oceania No
Iraq Britain Asia No Trinidad and
Tobago
Britain Americas Yes
Jamaica Britain Americas Yes Tunisia France Africa Yes
Jordan Britain Asia No Tuvalu Britain Oceania No
Kenya Britain Africa Yes Uganda Britain Africa Yes
Kiribati Britain Oceania No United Arab
Emirates
Britain Asia No
Kuwait Britain Asia No United States Britain Americas Yes
Laos France Asia No Uruguay Spain Americas Yes
Lebanon France Asia No Vanuatu Britain Oceania No
Lesotho Britain Africa No Venezuela Spain Americas No
Liberia USA Africa No Vietnam France Asia Yes
Libya Italy Africa No Zambia Britain Africa Yes
Zimbabwe Britain Africa No
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Web Appendix 2: Data on distance major economic centre and major port
Country Distance(KM) Capital Port Source
Algeria 4.83 Algiers Algiers https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algeria
Angola 8.05 Luanda Luanda https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luanda
Argentina 4.83 Buenos Aires Buenos Aires https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argentina
Australia 8.05 Melbourne Melbourne Campante et al., 2016
Bahamas 3.703 Nassau Nassau https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Bahamas
Bangladesh 216.27 Dhaka Chittagong https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh
Bolivia 537.93 Sucre Iquique https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bolivia
Brazil 4.83 Rio de Janeiro Rio de Janeiro Campante et al., 2016
Burkina Faso 841.56 Ouagadougou Abidjan https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ouagadougou
Cameroon 8.05 Douala Douala https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Douala
Canada 4.83 Quebec City Quebec City https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Province_of_
Canada
Chile 109.14 Santiago Valparaiso Campante et al., 2016
Colombia 700.56 Bogota Barranquila https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colombia
Congo 379.44 Brazzaville Pointe-Noire https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_
the_Congo
Costa Rica 117.08 San Jose Limon https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Costa_Rica





378.25 Kinshasa Pointe-Noire https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_
Republic_of_the_Congo
Ecuador 276.92 Quito Guayaquil https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecuador
Egypt 181.82 Cairo Port Said https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egypt
El salvador 25.20 San Salvador Coast https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/El_Salvador
Ethiopia 556.48 Addis Abba Djibouti https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethiopia
Gabon 4.83 Libreville Libreville https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gabon
Gambia 4.83 Banjul Banjul https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Gambia




Guinea 20.93 Conakry Conakry https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guinea





Honduras 208.53 Tegucigalpa La Ceiba https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tegucigalpa
Hong Kong 4.83 Hong Kong Hong Kong https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hong_Kong
India 107.73 Calcutta Shore line https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolkata
Indonesia 4.83 Jakarta Jakarta https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia
Ivory Coast 16.10 Abidjan Abidjan Campante et al., 2016
Jamaica 4.83 Kingston Kingston https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jamaica
Kenya 448.35 Nairobi Mombassa https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenya
Madagascar 213.57 Antananarivo Toamasina https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antananarivo
Malaysia 39.94 Kuala Lumpur Coast Campante et al., 2016
Mali 694.81 Bamako Conakry https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mali
Malta 4.83 Valletta Valletta https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malta
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Mexico 317.59 Mexico City Heroica VeraCruz https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexico
Morocco 154.30 Fez Rabat https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fez
New Zealand 4.83 Wellington Wellington https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Zealand
Nicaragua 387.87 Managua PuertoCabezas https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaragua
Niger 1135.53 Niamey Abidjan https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niger
Nigeria 16.00 Lagos Lagos Campante et al., 2016
Pakistan 12.88 Karachi Karachi Campante et al., 2016
Panama 64.87 Panama City Coast https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panama_City
Paraguay 933.41 Asunción Porto Alegre https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paraguay
Peru 4.83 Lima Lima https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lima
Senegal 4.83 Dakar Dakar https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senegal
Sierra leone 4.83 Freetown Freetown https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sierra_Leone
Singapore 4.83 Singapore Singapore https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore
South Africa 8.05 Cape Town Cape Town https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Africa
Sri Lanka 4.83 Colombo Colombo https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colombo
Sudan 670.09 Khartoum Port Sudan https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudan
Tanzania 9.66 Dar-es-Salaam
Dar-es-
Salaam Campante et al., 2016
Togo 4.83 Lome Lome https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Togo
Trinidad 4.83 Port of Spain Port of Spain https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trinidad_and_
Tobago
Tunisia 11.27 Tunis Tunis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tunisia
Uganda 942.38 Kampala Mombassa https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uganda
Uruguay 4.83 Montevideo Montevideo https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uruguay
USA 57.93 Washington Baltimore https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington,
_D.C.
Venezuela 15.07 Caracas Caracas https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venezuela
Viet Nam 72.20 Hanoi Hai Phong https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam
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Web Appendix 3A: IV Regression with additional controls using a g-estimation procedure using as main explanatory variable Average Protection against
expropriation risk, 1985-1995
Maternal Neonatal Infant Under 5 Skilled Birth DPT3 Measles (MCV) OOP8 UHC9
IV Results Mortality1 Mortality2 Mortality3 Mortality4 Attended5 Coverage6 Immunization7
Average protection against -1.50** -0.84** -0.96** -1.16** 25.00** 20.65* 20.78* -14.55 40.75**
expropriation risk, 1985-95 (0.63) (0.39) (0.43) (0.49) (11.77) (11.55) (11.41) (12.98) (19.08)
Latitude -0.85 0.90 0.58 0.61 -32.43 0.45 -7.61 -8.10 55.92
(1.18) (0.73) (0.80) (0.91) (21.93) (21.52) (21.25) (24.17) (56.16)
Malaria -0.88 0.20 0.10 0.02 35.26 57.24 56.16 -80.70 100.08
(2.63) (1.62) (1.78) (2.03) (48.93) (48.03) (47.42) (53.95) (89.44)
Log(ĜDP ) -1.57** -0.79* -0.89* -1.10* 27.34* 22.44 22.59* -19.82 51.23**
(0.74) (0.46) (0.50) (0.57) (13.81) (13.55) (13.38) (15.22) (23.05)
Total health spending (%GDP) -0.22 -0.22* -0.14 -0.14 -1.98 1.36 2.54 -6.73 3.91
(0.21) (0.13) (0.14) (0.16) (3.92) (3.85) (3.80) (4.33) (9.07)
Colonizer (baseline = other)
British -0.18 -0.31 -0.36 -0.39 2.26 10.51 10.82 18.64* -38.39
(0.47) (0.29) (0.32) (0.36) (8.70) (8.54) (8.43) (9.59) (23.54)
French -0.24 -0.33 -0.36 -0.36 10.32 10.36 8.95 10.87 -20.64
(0.51) (0.31) (0.34) (0.39) (9.41) (9.24) (9.12) (10.38) (25.24)
Spanish -0.46 -0.40 -0.52 -0.65 16.53 18.39* 22.61** 16.54 -0.56
(0.54) (0.33) (0.36) (0.42) (10.05) (9.87) (9.74) (11.08) (23.72)
Democracy -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.09 -1.60 2.42 2.57 2.73 5.15
(0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (2.14) (2.10) (2.07) (2.36) (4.64)
Official development assistance -0.01 -0.01** -0.01* -0.01** 0.17 0.12 0.12 -0.04 0.10
(% government spending) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.24)
Economic globalization 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.39 -0.65 -0.68 0.37 -0.42
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.56) (0.55) (0.54) (0.62) (1.07)
Constant 14.96*** 9.15*** 10.22*** 11.66*** -67.43 -53.71 -56.30 117.85 -225.44**
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(3.54) (2.19) (2.39) (2.73) (65.95) (64.74) (63.92) (72.71) (109.50)
R2 0.701 0.688 0.704 0.694 0.671 0.00986 0.160 0.359 0.592
OLS results
Average Protection against -0.77*** -0.51*** -0.57*** -0.62*** 15.56*** 6.28*** 6.90*** -8.01*** 19.37***
expropriation risk, 1985-95 (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (2.04) (1.53) (1.65) (2.29) (4.13)
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 45
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Source: Data from the World Bank and WHO for 62 former colonies covering the period
2000-2014. All the outcomes are expressed in Logarithms, except those measured as a proportion of the population. Average protection against expropriation risk is on
a scale from 0 to 10, where a higher score means more protection against expropriation of private investment by government.
1 - Per 100,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 2 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 3 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 4 - Per 1,000
Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 5 - % of births attended by a skilled health personnel (Latest Available Year); 6 - % of Total Population, Average (2000-2014);
7 - % of Total Population (2000-2014); 8 – Out of Pocket expenditure as % of the budget; 9 - formal health coverage as % of the population. Total health spending is both
public and private spending on health measured as a % of GDP. Colonizer dummies measure who the main colonizing power was during the nineteenth century.
Democracy is a measure of political rights and civil liberties from Freedom House, measured between 2000 and 2014. Official development assistance measures the aid
received by each country between 2000 and 2014, measured as a proportion of government spending. Economic globalization comes from KOF and measures trade
flows as well as financial flows.39
Web Appendix 3B: IV Regression with additional controls using a g-estimation procedure using as main explanatory variable Proportion of deaths recorded
Maternal Neonatal Infant Under 5 Skilled Birth DPT3 Measles (MCV) OOP8 UHC9
Covariates Mortality1 Mortality2 Mortality3 Mortality4 Attended5 Coverage6 Immunization7
Comprehensiveness of -1.87*** -1.17** -1.33** -1.57*** 31.82** 24.64* 25.05* -13.73 45.93*
death registration (0.67) (0.45) (0.50) (0.57) (13.61) (12.94) (12.85) (14.45) (22.98)
Latitude -1.37 0.43 0.05 0.04 -30.01 4.12 -4.07 -3.50 48.03
(1.07) (0.71) (0.79) (0.91) (21.72) (20.64) (20.50) (23.07) (52.56)
Malaria -1.09 -0.54 -0.80 -0.89 41.89 57.24 56.99 -57.93 77.35
(2.18) (1.45) (1.62) (1.85) (44.32) (42.12) (41.83) (47.06) (83.44)
Log(ĜDP ) -1.20** -0.70* -0.82** -1.01** 27.91** 19.94* 20.41** -13.51 44.82**
(0.53) (0.35) (0.39) (0.45) (10.71) (10.18) (10.11) (11.37) (18.95)
Total health spending (%GDP) -0.04 -0.08 0.02 0.03 -2.68 0.37 1.57 -7.35 6.27
(0.21) (0.14) (0.16) (0.18) (4.31) (4.10) (4.07) (4.58) (9.28)
Colonizer (baseline = other)
British -0.08 -0.22 -0.25 -0.28 1.79 9.75 10.09 17.66* -36.05
(0.43) (0.29) (0.32) (0.36) (8.73) (8.30) (8.24) (9.27) (22.31)
French -0.32 -0.40 -0.42 -0.43 10.72 10.47 9.11 10.99 -20.17
(0.47) (0.32) (0.35) (0.40) (9.67) (9.19) (9.13) (10.27) (24.82)
Spanish -0.21 -0.19 -0.28 -0.39 15.55 16.47* 20.80** 14.88 3.61
(0.47) (0.32) (0.35) (0.40) (9.67) (9.19) (9.13) (10.27) (21.65)
Democracy -0.12 -0.10 -0.09 -0.12 -1.44 2.50 2.66 2.88 5.30
(0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (2.23) (2.12) (2.10) (2.36) (4.52)
Official development assistance -0.01 -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 0.16* 0.10 0.10 -0.04 0.13
(% government spending) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.22)
Economic globalization 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.44 -0.63 -0.67 0.20 -0.29
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.53) (0.50) (0.50) (0.56) (0.99)
Constant 6.73*** 4.45*** 4.86*** 5.23*** 67.07*** 58.15*** 56.20*** 42.20** -14.96
(0.78) (0.52) (0.58) (0.66) (15.86) (15.07) (14.97) (16.84) (34.24)
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R2 0.742 0.687 0.690 0.681 0.661 0.0457 0.181 0.389 0.624
OLS Results
Comprehensiveness of -0.97*** -0.65*** -0.72*** -0.79*** 19.13*** 7.76*** 8.59*** -9.86*** 23.08***
death registration (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (2.47) (1.85) (1.99) (2.80) (5.30)
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 45
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Source: Data from the World Bank and WHO for 62 former colonies covering the period
2000-2014. All the outcomes are expressed in Logarithms, except those measured as a proportion of the population. Average protection against expropriation risk is on
a scale from 0 to 10, where a higher score means more protection against expropriation of private investment by government.
1 - Per 100,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 2 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 3 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 4 - Per 1,000
Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 5 - % of births attended by a skilled health personnel (Latest Available Year); 6 - % of Total Population, Average (2000-2014);
7 - % of Total Population (2000-2014); 8 – Out of Pocket expenditure as % of the budget; 9 - formal health coverage as % of the population. Total health spending is both
public and private spending on health measured as a % of GDP. Colonizer dummies measure who the main colonizing power was during the nineteenth century.
Democracy is a measure of political rights and civil liberties from Freedom House, measured between 2000 and 2014. Official development assistance measures the aid
received by each country between 2000 and 2014, measured as a proportion of government spending. Economic globalization comes from KOF and measures trade
flows as well as financial flows.41
Web Appendix 4A: IV Regression using a g-estimation procedure which de-mediates for GDP and total health spending using as main explanatory
variable Average Protection against expropriation risk, 1985-1995
Maternal Neonatal Infant Under 5 Skilled Birth DPT3 Measles (MCV) OOP8 UHC9
IV Results Mortality1 Mortality2 Mortality3 Mortality4 Attended5 Coverage6 Immunization7
Average protection against -0.61*** -0.45*** -0.52*** -0.60*** 1.02 8.84*** 6.70*** -5.71** 14.49**
expropriation risk, 1985-95 (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (2.39) (2.18) (2.12) (2.77) (6.36)
Latitude 0.47 1.71** 1.56** 1.86** -42.68** -21.34 -30.75* 12.11 -56.41
(0.91) (0.65) (0.69) (0.78) (18.09) (16.51) (16.03) (21.00) (45.26)
Malaria 4.26*** 2.61*** 3.11*** 3.97*** -18.63 -39.01*** -36.54** -1.09 -146.46***
(0.79) (0.56) (0.60) (0.67) (15.60) (14.24) (13.82) (18.11) (42.41)
Constant 10.05*** 5.79*** 6.62*** 7.01*** -61.93*** 60.72*** 47.05*** 96.61*** -45.15
(0.75) (0.54) (0.57) (0.64) (14.92) (13.62) (13.22) (17.32) (38.88)
R2 0.610 0.527 0.598 0.632 0.0949 0.316 0.214 -0.0357 0.382
OLS results
Average Protection against -0.77*** -0.51*** -0.57*** -0.62*** 15.56*** 6.28*** 6.90*** -8.01*** 19.37***
expropriation risk, 1985-95 (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (2.04) (1.53) (1.65) (2.29) (4.13)
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 45
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Source: Data from the World Bank and WHO for 62 former colonies covering the period
2000-2014. All the outcomes are expressed in Logarithms, except those measured as a proportion of the population. Average protection against expropriation risk is on
a scale from 0 to 10, where a higher score means more protection against expropriation of private investment by government.
1 - Per 100,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 2 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 3 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 4 - Per 1,000
Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 5 - % of births attended by a skilled health personnel (Latest Available Year); 6 - % of Total Population, Average (2000-2014);
7 - % of Total Population (2000-2014); 8 – Out of Pocket expenditure as % of the budget; 9 - formal health coverage as % of the population.
Each dependent variable has been demediated to remove the effect of GDP and total health spending on the outcome.
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Web Appendix 4B: IV Regression using a g-estimation procedure which de-mediates for GDP and total health spending using as main explanatory
variable Proportion of deaths recorded
Maternal Neonatal Infant Under 5 Skilled Birth DPT3 Measles (MCV) OOP8 UHC9
Covariates Mortality1 Mortality2 Mortality3 Mortality4 Attended5 Coverage6 Immunization7
Comprehensiveness of -1.67*** -1.16*** -1.20*** -1.35*** 1.26 12.79*** 11.81*** -10.67** 35.21**
death registration (0.23) (0.16) (0.17) (0.19) (3.59) (3.28) (3.27) (4.21) (13.52)
Latitude -2.70** -0.55 -0.88 -0.92 -39.15** 11.41 -3.48 -11.83 13.38
(1.08) (0.75) (0.77) (0.86) (16.63) (15.18) (15.12) (19.49) (51.01)
Malaria 1.04 0.22 0.35 0.78 -13.21 7.95 -0.97 -31.44 -65.00
(1.26) (0.88) (0.91) (1.01) (19.56) (17.86) (17.79) (22.93) (68.87)
Constant 2.04*** 0.44* 1.42*** 1.29*** -59.56*** 94.54*** 87.82*** 57.60*** 84.79***
(0.36) (0.25) (0.26) (0.29) (5.56) (5.07) (5.06) (6.52) (17.20)
R2 0.780 0.731 0.744 0.753 0.0965 0.334 0.319 0.105 0.443
OLS Results
Comprehensiveness of -0.97*** -0.65*** -0.72*** -0.79*** 19.13*** 7.76*** 8.59*** -9.86*** 23.08***
death registration (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (2.47) (1.85) (1.99) (2.80) (5.30)
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 45
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Source: Data from the World Bank and WHO for 62 former colonies covering the period
2000-2014. All the outcomes are expressed in Logarithms, except those measured as a proportion of the population. Countries are coded as 1 on our measure of the
Comprehensiveness of death registration is measured on a 4-point scale as described in the paper.
1 - Per 100,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 2 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 3 - Per 1,000 Live Births, Average (2000-2014); 4 - Per 1,000 Live
Births, Average (2000-2014); 5 - % of births attended by a skilled health personnel (Latest Available Year); 6 - % of Total Population, Average (2000-2014); 7 - % of
Total Population (2000-2014); 8 – Out of Pocket expenditure as % of the budget; 9 - formal health coverage as % of the population.
Each dependent variable has been demediated to remove the effect of GDP and total health spending on the outcome.
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